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The Social Warp of Science:




Traditional empiricism, although largely abandoned, has marked the social studies of
science through the persistent division between macrolevel analysis of the institutions
promoting and regulating science and microlevel analysis of the laboratory, theories,
and experiments. Further traces appear in the largely separate methodologies used in
social studies of science, which do not draw from political theory, and studies in political
theory, which are silent with respect to the expression of power in the development of
science. Poststructuralist conceptions of science have reinforced this divcsion by encour-
aging a turn away from explanations that assume human agency and accountability.This
article attempts to bridge the present methodological gulf between political theory and
the social studies of science through methods that are sensitive to the nature and
operation of power and to its expression in discourse. The application of these methods
in the study of genetic engineering policy m the United States and the United Kingdom
is outlined.
The broad contours of the genetic engineering story are well known:
the first controlled genetic engineering experiments in 1972, which were
uniformly recognized as a novel development, heralding the arrival of
synthetic biology; the moratorium on research in 1974, as a result of which
scientists voluntarily restricted their activities; the international conference
at Asilomar, California, in 1976; the intense public controversy that captured
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the attention of Congress as well as several local communities in 1977; and
finally, the disappearance of the issue and the rapid deregulation of the field
in the early 1980s.
The received interpretation of these events is also well known. The locus
classicus is the retrospective account by Donald Fredrickson, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) director under whom the controls were first
developed and later dismantled, presented at the annual meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1982.’ The title of
Fredrickson’s talk was &dquo;Science and the Cultural Warp&dquo;-an accurate indi-
cation of two of the main parameters he used in his history, namely, &dquo;science
and its practitioners,&dquo; on the one hand, and &dquo;the public,&dquo; assumed to be
immersed in a prevailing &dquo;anti-scientific&dquo; culture on the other. In this ac-
count, the dismantling of the American controls is portrayed as rationally
directed by technical experts with privileged access to specialized knowledge
in the face of resistance from an irrational public. The genetic engineering
episode is cast as a war between truth and error, rational analysis, and
irrational alarmism, in which rationality and truth ultimately won.
In this article, I offer a competing interpretation of the evolution of
American recombinant DNA policy. However, with a broad debate about
&dquo;the objectivity question in history&dquo; in progress, such an attempt requires
some preliminary justification.2 In what sense, and according to what criteria,
can a historical account claim to interpret and explain its subject matter?
I address this question in the section that follows, then turn to the genetic
enginccring case itself.
The Challenges of Empiricism and Poststructuralism
The history and sociology of science, liberated in the 1960s from tradi-
tional empiricism, embarked on important studies showing that science is as
much a product of its social environment as an account of natural phenomena;
a variety of sociological schemata to conceptualize the &dquo;social construction&dquo;
or &dquo;shaping&dquo; of science and technology have also resulted. The fading of
empiricism also opened the study of scientific development to the influences
of feminism, poststructuralism, and hermeneutics. Although differing in
important respects, all of these intellectual currents broke with the Rankean
ideal of history as a politically neutral, objective account of the past.
This new emphasis has produced investigations and analyses of the
laboratory as the site of construction of scientific knowledge, of experiments
and experimental practice, of sciAntific discourse, and of the mobilization of
discursive and visual resources in the pursuit and promotion of science.3 But,
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whether they focus on behavioral minutiae of laboratory life, on the wispy
interface between the material world and the discourses purporting to de-
scribe it, or on novel conceptual schema with which to analyze science, many
current studies are marked by a kind of epistemological agnosticism: The in-
sistence of laboratory ethnographers on intractable particularity leaves little
room for generalized understanding beyond the heightened self-awareness
of the observer, their protests to the contrary. And some have embraced ex-
treme forms of relativism, claiming that to attempt to understand social or
natural worlds is to construct mirages. According to that view, the objects
that we would claim to encounter cannot survive that claim on them; they
dissolve into the verbal images constructed of them.
On the other hand, much is still being written about science that embraces
empiricist conceptions of its history; the assumption that science and its
methods are isolated from social influence is still deeply embedded in the
natural sciences and the general culture. Science purportedly achieves truth,
eliminates error, and disseminates objective understanding; and its history
merely recounts that process. The received view of the history of genetic
engineering policy is a case in point.
Considerable evidence concerning the evolution of genetic engineering
policy throws such views into question, however. First, the sociopolitical
context of policy making cannot be ignored. It is notable that nowhere in
Fredrickson’s account is there mention of the relevance of the social, politi-
cal, and economic contexts in which recombinant DNA policy evolved, and
of the growing interests in industry and government circles in developing the
new field rapidly. That the early years of the 1970s when the possibility of
genetic engineering was demonstrated were also a time when scientists were
coming under increasing pressure to demonstrate the utility of their research
and when private industry was turning to new fields of high technology as
sources of high returns on investment, that in the period 1979-82 the infant
genetic engineering firms were competing fiercely for products and patents,
as were multinational chemical and pharmaceutical corporations for &dquo;win-
dows&dquo; on this field, and that nation-states, individual states within the United
States, and universities were all struggling for a piece of the action - none of
this figures in Fredrickson’s story. Nor is there mention of the powerful
interests emerging in the late 1970s to promote deregulation of industry. Yet
there is abundant evidence that these trends were highly influential in shaping
interests in the emerging field of genetic engineering as well as perceptions
of its social uses and impacts. The received view does not attempt to explain
why such evidence can be set aside.
To assume that the formation of genetic engineering policy was a dispas-
sionate, politically neutral process of technical assessment excludes any
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analysis of its sociopolitical context. A portrait of scientists, government
representatives, and corporate executives objectively assessing the implica-
tions of recombinant DNA technology on purely technical grounds can be
nothing more than a silhouette. Moreover, the received view takes the
discourse about the issues posed by genetic engineering as self-evident: It
cannot explain why the terms and categories of debate changed over time or
why those in Britain and the United States differed significantly.
There are thus two main temptations involved in writing the history of
genetic engineering policy: on the one hand, the empiricist impulse to
exclude social influences entirely, offering the writer the satisfaction of
producing an account not rendered ambiguous or problematic by consider-
ation of the (by no means clear and unambiguous) society in which policy
was made; on the other hand, the poststructuralist impulse to insist that both
science and history are shot through with social and cultural influences but
to deny the possibility of a privileged view of either.
Bringing Power Back In
To avoid the reductionism characteristic of each polarity, I assume neither
that the history of genetic engineering policy reduces to a narrative of
technical decisions reached in the course of a rational process of technical
assessment nor that discourse analysis or &dquo;thick description&dquo; alone is ade-
quate to an explanation of events. The crucial element that each approach
excludes by its own theoretical premises is an investigation of the political
economy of science - the power relations affecting the direction and pace of
research and development that crystallize in government policy. The received
view, in claiming that policy rests on a technical logic, would deny that power
relations are relevant; the broad tendency of poststructuralist treatments of
science is to ignore them.4
Yet genetic engineering - from its inception an obviously major scientific
and technological resource - provoked in those responsible for its develop-
ment and control actions and arguments that demand political and economic
analysis. Examining this dimension of genetic engineering policy is crucial
to explaining its development. The history of policy formation needs to be
investigated in ways that are sensitive not only to technical and cultural
characteristics of the issues raised by genetic engineering but also to the
nature and operation of the power relations characterizing its actors.
Thus in the background of the choice of a theoretical framework are
several issues concerning the nature, operation, and location of power,
assumed in its most general form to be a capacity attributed either to human
agents or to systems in which they act, to bring about effects on other actors
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(who, it is assumed, would act differently in its absence).5 First, there is the
question of who exercises power and how? Is power possessed by agents
(either individuals or social groups) or is it an attribute of systems or
structures? A voluntarist tradition that runs from Hobbes and Locke to Wright
Mills, Dahl, and Lukes assumes that the historical subject has an &dquo;ineradica-
ble and perhaps crucial explanatory role,&dquo;6 rooted in the complementary ideas
of human agency and human responsibility; in contrast, various forms of
structuralism posit systemic relations as fundamental and, in the limiting
case, as determining human action. Debates in the 1950s between C. Wright
Mills and Talcott Parsons and in the 1970s between Marxists Ralph Miliband
and Nicos Poulantzas exemplify these polarities.’
Because various social groups were visibly struggling over genetic engi-
neering policy, it seems reasonable to assume both that these actors were
(voluntarily) pursuing their interests and also that they did so within limits
set by possible structural constraints. It also seems important to leave open
the possibility that agents may act to change and modify structural con-
straints. Consequently, this study examines the evolving social, economic,
and political contexts in which genetic engineering developed and how
interests in the field were formed and constrained in these contexts. The
problem of identifying and locating &dquo;interests&dquo; seems relatively uncontro-
versial in practice, although it has attracted considerable theoretical debated
Interests often insist on being heard, and when they do not, they are often
expressed in other types of activity that are equally noteworthy.
Second, there is the epistemological question of how power is properly to
be located-an issue that gave rise to an extended debate in the 1960s and
1970s, mainly in the American political science community. Members of the
&dquo;pluralist&dquo; school assumed not only that power is distributed throughout dem-
ocratic societies but also that its operation should be determined by investi-
gating observable behavior, specifically, the decisions taken in formal policy
arenas.9 This position was countered by &dquo;postpluralists&dquo; Schattschneider,
Bachrach, and Baratz, who argued generally that power in democratic
societies was far more concentrated, operating most crucially and influen-
tially out of sight of those who can see only the formal policy process. to In
Schattschneider’s words: &dquo;The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heav-
enly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent
of the people cannot get into the pressure system.&dquo; &dquo; Postpluralists therefore
argued that it was not sufficient to confine attention to concrete decisions
made in the formal policy process, because that approach excludes any
consideration of the informal processes taking place elsewhere that might
affect the scope of the issues placed on the formal agenda. These might
ultimately be more influential for policy formation than formal decisions.
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Figure 1
SOURCE. Adapted from Saunders (1979, 29).
The nature of the debate between pluralists and postpluralists is nicely
represented by Saunders in a diagram (see Figure 1). If B wishes A to address
a demand, the matter may be taken up in a formal policy arena and either
accepted or rejected (level 1). Or A may take steps to ensure that the matter
is kept off the formal agenda through a variety of tactics (level 2). Or B may
fail to articulate the demand because he or she anticipates that it will be
rejected or ignored (level 3). Finally, B may even fail to formulate his or her
demand because A is able to influence or even determine B’s very desires
(level 4). As Schattschneider memorably registered the nonneutrality of
organizations at all of these levels: &dquo;All forms of political organization have
a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppres-
sion of others, because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues
are organized into politics while others are organized out.&dquo; t2
Although pluralists held that only events at level 1 could be observed,
postpluralists Bachrach and Baratz argued that what they called &dquo;non-
decisions&dquo; at levels 2, 3, and 4 were equally, if not more, important: &dquo;Of
course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that
affect B [level 1 ]. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies
to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional prac-
tices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of
only those issues that are comparatively innocuous to A [levels 2-4].&dquo; ’3In
other words, interests act and power is exercised not only in votes &dquo;on stage&dquo;
but also in determining such matters as the selection of a policy arena, the
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appointment of decision makers, the organization of agendas, and the dis-
semination of decisions. Such actions, they claimed, might never be regis-
tered formally but could mark the outcome significantly. Thus they repre-
sented a &dquo;second face&dquo; of power that had been ignored by pluralists.
Pluralists responded by arguing positivistically that, because only deci-
sions in a formal arena were observable, the second face of power did not
exist. 14 Bachrach and Baratz defended their position by claiming that non-
decisions could be observed whenever there was conflict, because this would
allow covert as well as overt grievances to surface.t5 For Lukes, such a
defense conceded far too much epistemological ground. To assume that
conflict was necessary to register the operation of power neglected its &dquo;most
effective and insidious use,&dquo; namely, to prevent conflict from ever arising.
According to Lukes, &dquo;to assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine
consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated
consensus by definitional fiat.&dquo; The most fundamental operation of power
was to manipulate &dquo;perceptions, cognitions and preferences&dquo; in such a way
that people failed even to formulate demands.’6
Precisely how interests could be defined in the absence of conflict re-
mained a question over which many took issue. Some, notably Habermas,
adopted a realist’s position, claiming that &dquo;real&dquo; interests can be defined theo-
retically through a (hypothetical) process that produces consensus through
&dquo;free, undistorted, and unrestricted argument.&dquo; &dquo; Lukes, in contrast, adopted
a constructivist position, maintaining in response to a critic that the analysis
should be at once &dquo;value-laden, theoretical and empirical. &dquo;t8 How this
approach to interests might be elaborated, however, remained unclear.
This article adopts a framework that is both postpluralist and constructivist
in orientation. It is assumed, first, that policy arenas generally bear the imprint
of their creators in the form of structural bias that unevenly distributes
influence, access, and control of the agenda and that the effects of bias should
be investigated at all levels of policy formation identified above. Beyond a
postpluralist analysis of the operation of interests, the study also emphasizes
the importance of examining their historical formation. Rather than posit
&dquo;real interests&dquo; as Habermas (1970) does, I assume that interests are contin-
gent, shaped by historical circumstances, and that the processes by which
values, beliefs, and practices become characteristic of a community and its
interests should be investigated. This approach can be used to elucidate the
most problematic level of &dquo;non-decision making&dquo; (level 4) identified by
postplural ists - the shaping of values and preferences so that some issues are
not even formulated. Lukes notes that &dquo;bias...is not sustained simply by a
series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially
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structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of
institutions.&dquo; ’9 How such behaviors and practices are related to the formation
of interests should be an important focus of historical inquiry.
Power and Language
A third issue concerning power-the relation between power and
language-has been raised by poststructuralists, notably Foucault. Foucault
placed &dquo;discursive practice&dquo; at the center of his analysis of social systems,
arguing that such practices embody power by supporting a &dquo;normalizing
gaze&dquo; - a socially defined system of rules that permits certain statements to
be made, orders these statements, allows us to identify some statements as
true, others as false, and still others as irrelevant.2o His achievement was to
demonstrate the organic, systemic relations between discursive practices,
disciplinary techniques, and social institutions, challenging in the process the
liberal separation of truth and power. As he expressed this challenge: &dquo;Truth
isn’t outside power or lacking in power: ... truth isn’t the reward of free
spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have
succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: It is
produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. , 2’ Consequently,
&dquo; ’truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce
and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.&dquo; 22
By claiming that power achieves its effects through disciplinary practice,
Foucault refocused the problem of power from the voluntarist concern with
&dquo;regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations&dquo; to their
&dquo;ultimate destinations with those points where it becomes capillary [com-
pletely dispersed].&dquo; 
23 In contrast to a voluntarist conception that associates
power with actors or agents, Foucault argued that the analysis of power
should not &dquo;concern itself with ... conscious intention or decision&dquo; and that
it should refrain from attempting to locate power. Instead, the analysis should
work at the level of &dquo;on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous
and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures,
dictate our behaviors, etc.&dquo; 24
Within the sociology of science, a move rather parallel to that of Foucault
was made by Callon, Latour, and others in transferring the focus of analysis
from the interests of scientists and of other agents to &dquo;networks&dquo; or &dquo;actor-
worlds&dquo; - alliances of human and nonhuman elements, such as scientific and
technical institutions, scientists, and the objects and procedures that scientists
create. The development of science and technology is conceived as the
process of formation of such networks and, in particular, the formation of
relatively stable ensembles of procedures, instruments, theories, results, and
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products to which various actors give their allegiance. Like Foucault’s
approach to discursive practice, this approach dissolves voluntarist concep-
tions of interests into merely the &dquo;temporarily stabilized outcomes of previ-
ous processes of enrollment.&dquo; 25
The poststructuralist move to place disembodied discursive practices
(Foucault) or networks (Callon and Latour) at the center of analysis has
occasioned vigorous criticism from those who wish to preserve clarity both
on normative issues concerning the use of power as well as on explanation
of development and change. Nancy Hartsock argues that Foucault’s exclusive
emphasis on the capillary nature of power - the sense that power is dispersed
through networks and hence is everywhere - makes any concept of account-
able exercise of power disappear. Hartsock argues further that in replacing
the traditional idea of sovereign power with the conception of power as
existing in local material institutions, methods that analyze the effects of
power exerted by large institutions are also replaced by methods that focus
exclusively on local, individual levels: &dquo;Power [for Foucault] is everywhere
and so ultimately nowhere.&dquo; Thus Foucault ultimately produces a disorient-
ing sense of ungroundedness: In rejecting attempts to define the sources of
power or reasons for transformations of discursive practice, he finally &dquo;stands
on no ground at all.&dquo; 
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Steven Shapin has pursued a roughly parallel line of argument with respect
to Latour’s dismissal of interests and rejection of explanation as a goal in
accounts of the development of science. Shapin notes that, although Latour
appears to ban interests, they are assumed in the background of his account
because his view of science is firmly rooted in his assumption that technosci-
ence is goal directed. But why science should be goal oriented, and who is
generating and defining these goals is not addressed. Shapin, like Hartsock,
is uneasy with the ungroundedness of Latour’s position: &dquo;This is a world in
which anything and anybody can be an actant or an actor.... It is the world
of the seamless web, a world in which everything is connected to everything
else.... Ultimately, those that truly inhabit the seamless web can say nothing
intelligible about its nature, even, if they are consistent, that it is seamless
and that it is a web.&dquo; 27
An important purpose of my study of genetic engineering policy is to
show how the discursive character of policy making is related to structural
bias. Discourse, understood in a Foucauldian sense, is treated (in a non-
Foucauldian, causal manner) as linked not only to preferred practice but also
to the powcr to control the policy arena. The analysis below draws attention
to the effects of the choice of discourse and the close relation between
discourse and practice at all levels of policy making (Figure 1), but, in
contrast to a poststructuralist analysis, it does so in relation to the evolution
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of interests in shaping the policy arena. The process of establishing a specific
discourse may be expected to reveal much about the politics of a given policy
arena because discourses achieve currency for political reasons.
One further methodological point is important. In this study, comparative
analysis of policy formation in two countries that developed distinct systems
of government control for genetic engineering is used for two main reasons:
first, because differences in either conception or implementation underscore
the arbitrary nature of decisions that might otherwise be seen as &dquo;natural&dquo; or
&dquo;logical&dquo;; second, because interactions between two national systems pro-
vide important indications of the operation of transnational influences (espe-
cially, in this case, the influence of corporations and international scientific
organizations and the interests of national governments in supporting the
ability of their scientists and corporations to compete internationally).
Underdetermined But Not Unconstrained
To return to the question raised initially about the possibility of historical
interpretation and explanation: This treatment of the development of genetic
engineering policy is located neither in the traditional empiricist camp of
those who see history as simply &dquo;uncovering&dquo; the past nor in the various
poststructuralist camps of those who insist that texts are all we can know.
History reduces neither to the sum of the facts nor to the sum of the texts.
Analyzing in terms of sociopolitical context, decision and nondecision
making, and discourse can produce an account of the history of genetic
engineering policy that not only reinterprets the limited data used to support
the received explanation exemplified by Fredrickson’s 1982 lecture but also
goes much further, providing a view of the political and economic interests
that shaped genetic engineering policy.
The position taken here is that the objects of history, although they may
be underdetermined, are never unconstrained. They will be accommodated
to the political values and commitments of their examiners, the methods of
inquiry adopted, and the cumulative impact of evidence on which inquiry
draws. As such, historical interpretation enters a larger process of debate and
dialogue in which its claims and the relations, categories, and values it uses
in establishing them are tested against competing positions. As Joan Scott
observes, &dquo;Written history both reflects and creates relations of power. Its
standards of inclusion and exclusion, measures of importance, and rules of
evaluation are not objective criteria but politically produced conventions....
There are contests, more or less conflictual, more or less explicit, about the
substance, uses, and meanings of the knowledge we call history.&dquo; 28
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The Development of American
and British Recombinant DNA Policy
The remainder of this article outlines how the methods described above
can be applied and how they produce an interpretation of the formation of
genetic engineering policy that not only competes with the received view but
encompasses a much wider range of evidence. Two phases of this history will
be addressed: first, the formation of genetic engineering policy in the United
States and the United Kingdom in the period 1972-75 and, second, the
dismantling of controls in both countries in 1978-82.
The Formation of Genetic Engineering Policy, 1972-76
The initial response to the advent of genetic engineering came from the
community of biomedical researchers close to the emerging field. A largely
internal debate about possible hazards led scientific leaders and institutions
with which they were connected to form committees in 1974 to address the
risk issue (the Berg committee under the auspices of the National Academy
of Sciences [NAS] in the United States and the Ashby committee, appointed
by the Advisory Board to the Research Councils in Britain); to organize an
international conference at Asilomar, California (1975); and to promulgate
government controls aimed at containing laboratory hazards. The standard
view of this response portrays these developments as a rational progression,
from initial inquiry to a technical response based on expert opinion. However,
as emphasized earlier, the actual concrete decisions that constitute policy
development are understood accurately only by examining how social inter-
ests shaped perceptions and governed the formal and informal processes that
defined the institutional environment, restricted participation in the decision
process, and limited the scope of the issues addressed.
The advent of genetic engineering activated diverse and often conflicting
interests in its future development: The scientific community, universities,
executive branches of governments, private industry, labor unions, and
pressure groups all responded in ways shaped by their own specific goals.29
The interests of scientists and their universities were affected by changes in
the emphasis of government sponsorship of science that began in the mid-
1960s. In the United States, the leveling-off of the postwar exponential
growth in government support and calls for accountability from politicians
brought to the fore the utilitarian dimension that had always been present in
the American research effort. Practical results from science assumed increas-
ing importance in the eyes of politicians and the bureaucrats who oversaw
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the American research effort. Similar pressures developed in Britain. There,
too, a decline in government support for civilian science set in, particularly
after 1973, when both sides of the British dual support system-the univer-
sities and the research councils-were hurt by cuts in government funding.
Commitment to protecting the autonomy of the universities and scientific
research (previously a stronger tradition in Britain than in the United States)
gave way before a growing emphasis on accountability and practical results.
The prospect that genetic engineering would produce not only important
progress in solving fundamental biological problems but also a wide array
of practical applications fitted well with this new policy emphasis on both
sides of the Atlantic.
Consequently, the new field promised to fulfill several needs. For scien-
tists, the techniques promised not only the novel directions in research and
the fast results required by serial-competitive funding arrangements but also
a powerful justification for continued support. Because molecular biology
had yielded spectacular theoretical advances but almost nothing in terms of
practical results, the prospect that genetic engineering would lead to the latter
made it especially valuable to researchers. For university administrators, the
techniques offered a prospect of generous and diverse sources of funding in
a period when support had become less assured, and when the ability to
demonstrate a practical payoff was becoming a significant criterion in
assessing grant applications. For the government agencies responsible for
promoting biomedical research (the U.S. NIH and the U.K. Medical Research
Council), genetic engineering offered both scientific advances of the type
that would foster national preeminence in science and practical applications
that would demonstrate the utility of the biomedical sciences to politicians.
These prospects were immediately perceived and defined in terms of inter-
national competition. Both in the United States and in Britain, it was feared
that significant delays in development might hamper researchers in what was
seen as a race with other countries.
The private sector had additional reasons for interest in genetic engineer-
ing : The techniques signified potential sources of new products and, just as
important, a new, energy-efficient mode of production. This meant at once a
threat to existing sources of profit and new opportunities for obtaining a high
rate of return on investment. Although large multinational pharmaceutical,
chemical, and energy corporations did not immediately take action, they
established ways to monitor closely the development of the field.
For each of these groups, the continuing development of recombinant
DNA technology held a powerful attraction; few among them were likely to
bear delaying the work patiently.
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While competitive interests in the new biology were being activated in
academia and industry, both the effects and the direction of Western science
and technology were being challenged more vigorously than ever before.
These challenges to unrestrained deployment of science and technology took
different forms in the United States and Britain but were influential in both
countries. In the United States, a diverse public interest movement had
mobilized to secure legislation aimed at two main goals: prevention of the
undesirable side effects of technology and expansion of public participation
in regulatory policy. The liberal Congresses of the late 1960s and early 1970s
responded by enacting a mass of environmental and safety legislation. The
regulatory impulse of the late 1960s and early 1970s opened policy processes
within government agencies to public scrutiny, but it is important to register
that control over those processes remained the prerogative of government
and industry: &dquo;Public participation&dquo; was largely limited to access to informa-
tion and the right to air positions at public hearings. The environmental
movement was given a voice but not a formal policy arena.
In Britain, reforms were more muted and in general did not significantly
change a tradition in which regulatory controls were a matter of negotiation
between private industry and government officials and largely shielded from
public scrutiny. But one important exception to that generalization was the
Health and Safety at Work Act enacted in 1974, which gave employees
extensive rights to representation both locally and on the tripartite Health and
Safety Commission. Trade unions, whose numbers grew substantially in the
1960s and 1970s, had not only a voice but also a formal arena. Furthermore,
technicians and many scientists in research laboratories were unionized. In
contrast to the situation in the United States, where few laboratory workers
belonged to unions, British trade unions constituted a significant countervail-
ing force with a strong influence within the Labour government.
These various interests were activated in the years following the ap-
pearance of genetic engineering techniques in the early 1970s.~ Initially,
the techniques triggered a mainly private debate within the community of
scientists close to the emerging field. Considerable concern was aired about
possible environmental and social impacts of the technology. As Cambridge
University molecular biologist Sydney Brenner wrote to the Ashby commit-
tee in 1974, &dquo;The essence is that we now have the tools to speed up biological
change and if this is carried out on a large enough scale then we can say that
if anything can happen it certainly will.&dquo; Brenner went on to warn of the
problems of controlling defense laboratories and drug companies &dquo;that can
and often do practice secrecy in their activities.&dquo; 3’ At the other end of the
spectrum, others focused on the possibility of moves to control biological
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research. Joshua Lederberg, then at Stanford University, wrote to a colleague,
&dquo;There is really a great danger of the whole matter getting seriously out of
hand and encumbering important research.&dquo; 32
At this stage, there was no single discourse, no single definition of the
problem, but within a year, that situation changed, as the biomedical research
community moved early on to transfer responsibility for an initial assessment
of the issue to the NAS (in the United States) and to the Advisory Board for
the Research Councils (in the United Kingdom). The obvious differences
between the British and American institutions responsible for forming an
initial policy assessment in Britain and the United States-the one public and
the other semiprivate - should not obscure their functional similarities: Both
were oriented toward promoting biomedical research, and their primary
constituencies were the communities of British and American biomedical
researchers. Members of the committees and groups appointed by these
institutions-the Ashby committee in Britain, the Berg committee in the
United States, and the Organizing Committee for the Asilomar Conference -
were drawn almost exclusively from their constituencies.
With the establishment of policy arenas in place-that is, with the struc-
tural bias of British and American policy arenas settled-other decisions
seemed natural. In particular, the scope of the genetic engineering issue was
radically reduced and redefined as one of &dquo;containing&dquo; unknown biohazards.
The question of social use of genetic engineering was consistently brack-
eted.3; As molecular biologist Paul Berg (a pioneer in the techniques, chair
of the NAS committee, and cochair of the Asilomar conference) held in 1974,
the issues raised by genetic engineering were not moral or ethical but matters
of public healthy The genetic engineering &dquo;problem&dquo; was thus framed in
terms of finding a technical response to a technical problem. This reduced,
technical discourse was almost unanimously embraced (within the biomed-
ical research community). On both sides of the Atlantic, those who contrib-
uted to the policy process would work largely within the boundaries of this
discourse.
Thus discourse and policy developed in a synergistic interaction with one
another. The proceedings of the Asilomar conference, for example, show that
a reductionist discourse bearing within it the seeds of a technical solution
was both an expression of scientific and economic interests in developing
the field without external intervention and at the same time a powerful
contributor to defining and reinforcing the central role of the biomedical
research community in policy making. It was in the interests of nearly all
admitted to policy-making arenas that they not jeopardize control of policy
by dissension, apparent inaction, or admitting as central those dimensions of
the issue that obviously transcended the expertise of scientists.
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In the United States, voluntary controls for genetic engineering research
were developed by an expert panel convened under the auspices of the NIH
and promulgated in 1976. In Britain, policy making initially followed a
similar course. The Ashby committee proposed that work could be resumed
under a voluntary code of practice using suitable technical controls. This
approach was in harmony with the kinds of controls anticipated by the Berg
committee-which was no coincidence because Berg, Ashby, and others
were in close contact with one another. A second committee - the Williams
committee-worked out a framework for categorizing hazards that bore a
distinct resemblance to that developed by the NIH. The strong anticipation
of the British scientific community in 1975 was that genetic engineering
would become the responsibility of a small expert committee-&dquo;a kind of
peer group,&dquo; as one scientist later recalled.35
In fact, those expectations were not realized in Britain. In the mid-1970s,
with a Labour government in office, the scientific and technical unions were
able to exert influence, first, in defining the genetic engineering issue as an
occupational health and safety problem; second, in pressing for regulation;
and, third, in insisting on representation in the policy arena.
What emerged in Britain, in contrast to the United States, was a kind of
compromise between the interests of the research establishment and those of
the unions: The Health and Safety Commission (HSC, roughly equivalent to
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]) would regu-
late ; the Medical Research Council would provide the secretariat-in other
words, would control the flow of advice to the HSC. And ambiguously
positioned between the two institutions was an anomalous creature known
as &dquo;GMAG&dquo; - the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group - formally exist-
ing outside both agencies as a QUANGO (quasi-autonomous nongovern-
mental organization). A broadly constituted committee with representation
of the scientific, business, and labor sectors as well as of the vaguely defined
public, GMAG was sometimes referred to as an &dquo;experiment in social
democracy,&dquo; brainchild of the secretary of state for education and science,
Shirley Williams. But it was more (or less) than that, for it was expected by
the government bureaucracies that created it to function within the frame-
works developed by the Ashby and Williams committees. Thus what GMAG
would accomplish was more than simply the outcome of balancing conflict-
ing interests: Resolution of conflict on GMAG took place largely within a
preexisting framework of assumptions and practices.
Despite that qualification, British and American policies took different
turns at this point as a result of the countervailing influence of the trade
unions. In particular, the two national discourses on the genetic engineering
problem diverged: in Britain, biohazard meant primarily hazards to employ-
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ees in laboratories and industry and secondarily hazards to the public. In the
United States, the term acquired the reverse sense.
Deregulation, 1979-82
For several years, from roughly 1977 to 1979, the British and American
systems diverged. The voluntary NIH controls survived a storm of public
criticism as well as congressional efforts to pass regulatory legislation. As
congressional interest faded away in 1978, the NIH and its RAC focused on
relaxing these controls. Meanwhile, the British GMAG, together with the
HSC, proceeded to implement a code of practice based on the initial appraisal
of hazards in 1976 and formulated within the regulatory framework defined
by the Health and Safety at Work Act. By the beginning of 1979, the British
perceived themselves to be &dquo;wildly out of line&dquo; with the United States.
However, by 1982, the substantive and procedural requirements of the two
systems again resembled one another: By that point, both systems required
minimal controls for most experiments and industrial processes.
An obvious question is why the distinct differences between these two
systems of controls, produced initially because of the influences of different
interest groups, eventually disappeared. The received view attributes this
convergence to a technical resolution of the biohazard controversy. However,
examination of the data that members of the RAC and the GMAG were asked
to consider reveals enormous uncertainties about hazards and very little
empirical data about which there was any solid consensus. For example, the
early focus on the hazards of using the bacterium E. coli K12 as a cloning
host became merely academic as the range of such vehicles expanded.36 Nor
is a poststructuralist analysis helpful: A focus on discourse alone cannot
explain the changes of discourse that took place. In contrast, the position
taken here is that an explanation must be sought both in the changes in the
social and political contexts of decision making that occurred in the late
1970s and early 1980s and in the ways these changes affected the interests
being expressed within official and unofficial policy-making bodies.
Evolution of American Policy, 1977-8237
In the United States, two main changes, one political, the other economic,
shaped interests in the rapid development of genetic engineering and opened
the way for pursuing that goal. In the first place, the biomedical research
sector (with the quiet support of industry) rallied to organize an extensive
effort to derail the genetic engineering legislation. The success of this effort
established the ability of the biomedical research sector and industry to
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control the policy arena. This success was notably in part a result of and also
a reinforcement for changes in biohazard discourse, namely, that &dquo;new
evidence&dquo; showed that the biohazards had been exaggerated.38
In the second place, there were clear signs by 1978 that the techniques
promised profitable commercial application. Investment in genetic engineer-
ing in the United States from corporate and venture capital sources began to
increase exponentially and continued doing so until the early 1980s. NIH
support also increased rapidly, more than doubling between 1978 and 1980.
In addition, an extended campaign on the part of the private sector for
government support for technological development began to bear fruit in the
form of the patent, budget allocation, and tax policies of first the Carter and
later the Reagan administrations. These policies encouraged joint university-
research programs in biotechnology, provided tax incentives for private
investment in research, and permitted universities to patent the results of
research funded by the federal government. These policies had the effect of
pumping millions of dollars of corporate and venture capital into the field-
thus further heating what was already a hot competition.39
A transformed recombinant DNA field saw both its sponsors and its
practitioners assume new social roles. As developers of patents on basic
techniques, as recipients of corporate grants for research, and as cosponsors
of new biotechnology companies, leading research universities established
major interests in the industrial development of the field. And so also did
research scientists, as equity holders, advisers, consultants, and executives
for new genetic engineering companies and multinational corporations. As
competition accelerated, pressures to pursue rapid development intensified
and multiplied. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, corporate representatives
and scientists alike framed the genetic engineering problem in terms of a
&dquo;race&dquo; in which the NIH controls presented a major &dquo;handicap.&dquo;
Private industry, which until that point had kept a low profile, began to
press actively for weakened controls, although not as visibly as the biomed-
ical research sector. Privately, corporations pressured the NIH to adapt the
NIH guidelines to their requirements. The features they particularly criticized
were the time-consuming procedures that required review by the large
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) and what they considered
to be too stringent safety requirements. In fall 1978, representatives of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association told the NIH director that gov-
ernmental limitation on the size of permissible cultures of genetically manip-
ulated organisms was &dquo;a timely issue.&dquo; 4° Less decorously, Genentech (one
of the leaders of the new genetic engineering firms that appeared in the 1970s
and 1980s) began to play hardball. The firm, which had negotiated a major
contract with Lilly for insulin production and was in the process of construct-
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ing a fermenter for large-scale cultures, threatened to ignore the NIH controls
unless these were reduced, on the ground that NIH review risked revealing
proprietary data and also on the ground that the risks were minor.4t Because
the NIH took no public action to respond to such arm-twisting, companies
like Genentech could press their agendas with impunity.
The Genentech affair also pinpoints the difficult double standard in NIH
relations with industry and academia. NIH had no legal authority to require
companies to comply with its guidelines-Genentech was flaunting only a
moral requirement, not a legal one-whereas scientists funded by the NIH
had no such license. Although their counterparts in industry could move
quickly with experiments, NIH grantees were often delayed by requirements
for review. And they had to divulge full details of their research -again a
discriminatory requirement in this increasingly competitive field. In 1978,
scientists were rumored to be voting with their feet-taking their projects to
countries with weaker controls. This again pressured the NIH to relax
controls.
At the same time, countervailing pressures for caution were enormously
weakened both by the demise of regulatory legislation and by the successes
of a corporate campaign for general deregulation, which the Carter adminis-
tration to an extent and the Reagan administration entirely endorsed. When
it became clear, toward the end of 1978, that Congress was unlikely to act to
control genetic engineering, public advocacy groups had almost no leverage
in the policy arena.
The strong (and, on this point, convergent) interests of the biomedical
research community and industry in weakening the NIH controls were
expressed initially in terms of the reshaping of the structural bias of the
principal policy arena, the NIH RAC, with important and subtle adjustments
in the committee’s composition and agenda. One expression of these changes
was a distinct shift in the discursive character of policy making. Previously,
NIH policy had stressed anticipating and forestalling unknown biohazards
so that the burden of proof fell on practitioners of genetic engineering to
demonstrate the safety of their techniques.42 After establishing the ability to
turn back congressional interest in regulation, that power could then be
deployed further to reconstitute the biohazard discourse.
In spring 1978, the NIH director announced to his advisory committee
that it was time for the burden of proof to shift to the public, to show that
genetic engineering was hazardous; the techniques henceforth would be
innocent until proven guilty. In the following years, the discourse and
practice of &dquo;containment of unknown biohazards&dquo; gave way to the claim that
genetic engineering posed &dquo;no extraordinary hazard&dquo; and therefore no longer
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required special precautions. In Foucauldian terms, a new system of power
was sustaining a new discourse.
The NIH controls were revised significantly in December 1978 and more
radically in January 1980, when the NIH director approved a proposal to drop
special containment requirements for most procedures that used the bacte-
rium E. coli K12 for cloning. A policy of crisis intervention replaced the
previous policy of hazard prevention. The decision was a clear victory for
the biomedical research and private sectors pressing for deregulation, and,
in the absence of any significant constituency opposing deregulation, the
subsequent dismantling of virtually all controls for laboratory research and
industrial production using genetic engineering was predictable.
The British Response, 1979-8243
The British were surprised by the precipitous turn toward deregulation in
the United States. One GMAG member recalled the atmosphere early in
1979: &dquo;There was an element of panic here.... People will put up with being
marginally out of line but not [to that extent].... We were in real trouble.&dquo;
Growing professional and commercial interests in developing the technology
in Britain (as in Europe generally) began to press for looser controls. &dquo;This
was one time when scientists were threatening to leave and meant it,&dquo; the
GMAG member recalled.&dquo; Industrialists warned in parliamentary hearings
that Britain was about to lose &dquo;a vital new heartland technology.&dquo; &dquo;Missing
out on a revolution in biotechnology&dquo; and &dquo;losing a generation of the best
young scientists [in molecular biology]&dquo; became rallying cries for those who
opposed the British controls. Further pressure on the British government was
exerted by the influential European Molecular Biology Organization, which
endorsed the more lenient American controls issued in December 1978.
In 1979, the Labour government responded to rising industrial interests
in genetic engineering by appointing a high-level committee composed of
members with strong interests in the industrial application of genetic engi-
neering. Representatives of the general public and the trade unions were
conspicuously excluded. The committee produced a &dquo;hard-hitting and inter-
ventionist&dquo; report, calling for strong government promotion of biotechnol-
ogy, including support for a national biotechnology company, and warning
of the &dquo;possible prejudicial consequences to British industry&dquo; if British
controls exceeded those elsewhere.
At the same time, the unions’ commitment to caution was losing ground
on GMAG. The new chair of the committee, Sir William Henderson, ap-
pointed at the beginning of 1979, made it clear from the start that the
committee’s responsibility for considering biohazards would not inhibit the
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realization of potential benefits. (Presumably, Henderson was confident of
the government’s support.) With the election of Margaret Thatcher in May
1979, the unions lost any remaining influence they had with the government.
Thatcher attacked the unions in many ways, undermined their public support,
and cut funding for government agencies, such as the HSC, that provided
their principal policy arena.
This changed political climate played a great part in GMAG’s subsequent
weakening of its earlier controls. By the beginning of 1978, GMAG was
using a risk assessment scheme developed by Brenner and others. The details
of GMAG’s application of this scheme are interesting because they demon-
strate the way in which technical variables were shaped by the political
context: Each time the American controls were reduced, these variables were
appropriately adjusted. As Henderson told the British science journal Nature
in December 1979, GMAG had been &dquo;slightly embarrassed&dquo; when the NIH
relaxed its controls in 1978, but it was now &dquo;extremely difficult to detect the
practical difference between the two systems.&dquo; Henderson was right, but only
for a month or so, whereupon the American controls plunged downward once
again. The British containment levels followed eight months later. As one
scientist involved in the development of the risk assessment scheme ob-
served : &dquo;[The scheme was] a peculiarly British way of saying ’OK, we’re
not changing anything, but in fact, we’re changing everything.’ 
&dquo;45 The fear
of being placed at a competitive disadvantage by weaker controls elsewhere
provided a powerful catalyst for the achievement of a careful parity between
the two systems.
Concluding Assessment
In conclusion, critical appraisal of differing historical interpretations of
the formation of genetic engineering policy in Britain and the United States
is both possible and desirable. In Fredrickson’s &dquo;Science and the Cultural
Warp,&dquo; &dquo;science&dquo; appears as a protected zone of universal knowledge, and
&dquo;culture&dquo; a pernicious influence from which science must be protected. The
dismantling of genetic engineering controls is depicted as the natural and
logical consequence of allowing the strong lights of reason and experience
to shine on the public’s irrational fear of the unknown. In contrast, methods
that leave open the possibility of examining social dimensions of science
show that there was nothing &dquo;logical&dquo; or &dquo;natural&dquo; about the evolution of
genetic engineering policy. Parity between the British and American controls
resulted not from rational, asocial analysis of the biohazard problem but from
the neutralization of countervailing interests and from the impetus to negate
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the issue produced by the intensifying scientific and industrial desire for rapid
development of the field.
To contest &dquo;readings&dquo; of historical evidence-to debate the categories of
analysis, the scope of interpretation, and the evidence to be encompassed by
any interpretation -strikes at real problems in history. That this is no matter
of indifference can be seen by the persistence and passion of the views
espoused by both actors and interpreters. In contrast to a poststructuralist
treatment of these events, it is assumed that comparison and evaluation can
proceed, however difficult this may be. Moreover, the desirability of that
struggle should be emphasized. The postmodern acceptance of epistemolog-
ical relativism not only marginalizes the social study of science but, at the
same time, creates an interpretative vacuum. Scientific and technological
development is implicated in some of the most extreme global problems-




2. For an insightful and wide-ranging account of the debate among American historians,
see Novick (1989).
3. Golinski (1990).
4. Nelkin (1989); Douglas (1990).
5. Lukes (1977, 6-7).
6. Ibid., 3.
7. Lukes (1991, chap. 6).
8. For debates among political scientists, see, for example, Saunders (1979, 33-48); for
debate among historians and sociologists of science, see, for example, Woolgar (1981), Barnes
(1981), MacKenzie (1981).
9. For example, Dahl (1957).
10. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970); Schattschneider (1960).
11. Schattschneider (1960, 35).
12. Ibid., 71.
13. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 948).
14. For example, Wolfinger (1971, 1063-80).
15. Bachrach and Baratz (1970, 49-50). See also the sensitive appraisal in Frey (1971,1094).
16. Lukes (1974, 23-24).
17. Habermas (1970, 360-75).
18. Lukes (1974, 57).
19. Ibid., 22.






25. Callon and Law (1982, 622).
26. Hartsock (1990, 169-70).
27. Shapin (1988).
28. Scott (1989, 681). 
29. Wright (forthcoming, chaps. 2 and 3).
30. Ibid., chaps. 4 and 5.
31. Brenner (1974).
32. Joshua Lederberg to Martin Kaplan, 23 September 1974 (Recombinant DNA History
Collection, Institute Archives, MIT).
33. For the exclusion of issues concerning military use of genetic engineering from the policy
arena, see Wright (1990).
34. Lewin (1974).
35. Interview with Sydney Brenner, 11 April 1980.
36. Risk assessment lagged far behind the technology. In any case, there is important
evidence indicating that key risk assessment experiments were not designed to test worst-case
scenarios: Wright (forthcoming, chap. 6).
37. Wright (forthcoming, chaps. 7, 8, and 10).
38. Wright (1986a; forthcoming, chaps. 6 and 7).
39. Wright (1986b; forthcoming, chap. 3).
40. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1978).
41. "Insulin Research Raises Debate" (1979).
42. This practice was essentially the legacy of the Asilomar conference, which collectively
acknowledged that the hazards of genetic engineering could be large and proposed relatively
strict containment requirements.
43. Wright (forthcoming, chaps. 9, 11).
44. Interview with Robert Williamson, 13 May 1980.
45. Interview with Robin Weiss, 18 June 1979.
References
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. Two faces of power. American Political Science
Review 56:947-52.
&mdash;. 1963. Decisions and non-decisions. American Political Science Review 57:632-42.
&mdash;. 1970. Power and poverty: Theory and practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barnes, Barry. 1981. On the "hows" and "whys" of cultural change. Social Studies of Science
11:481-97.
Brenner, Sydney. 1974. Evidence for the Ashby Working Party. Paper submitted to the Working
Party on the experimental manipulation of the genetic composition of microorganisms, 26
September, Recombinant DNA History Collection, Institute Archives, MIT.
Callon, Michel, and John Law. 1982. On interests and their transformation: Enrollment and
counter-enrollment. Social Studies of Science 12:615-25.
Dahl, Robert. 1957. Apreface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Douglas, Susan. 1990. Review of Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of
Technological Systems. Isis 81:80-83.
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977.
New York: Pantheon.
101
Fredrickson, Donald. 1982. Science and the cultural warp: RDNA as a case study. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, Washington, DC.
Frey, Frederick. 1971. Comment: On issues and non-issues in the study of power. American
Political Science Review 65:1081-101.
Golinski, Jan. 1990. The theory of practice and the practice of theory: Sociological approaches
to the history of science. Isis 81:492-505.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1970. Toward a theory of communicative action. Inquiry 12:360-75.
Hartsock, Nancy. 1990. Foucault on power. In Feminism/postmodernism,edited by Linda J.
Nicholson, 157-75. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall.
Insulin research raises debate on DNA guidelines. 1979. New York Times, 29 June, A18.
Lewin, Roger. 1974. Ethics and genetic engineering. New Scientist, 17 October, 16.
Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A radical view. London: Macmillan.
&mdash;. 1977. Essays in social theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
&mdash;. 1991. Moral conflict and politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacKenzie, Donald. 1981. Interests, positivism and history. Social Studies of Science 11:498-503.
Nelkin, Dorothy. 1989. Science studies in the 1990s. Science, Technology, & Human Values
14:305-11.
Novick, Peter. 1989. That noble dream: Objectivity and the American historical profession.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Saunders, Peter. 1979. Urban politics: A sociological interpretation. London: Hutchinson.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The semi-sovereign people. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Scott, Joan Wallach. 1989. History in crisis? The others’ side of the story. American Historical
Review 94:680-92.
Shapin, Steven. 1988. Following scientists around: Review of Latour, Science in Action. In
Social Studies of Science 18:533-50.
United States. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 1978. Minutes, meeting of DHEW
committee with representatives of the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ association, 12 October.
Wolfinger, Raymond. 1971. Nondecisions and the study of local politics. American Political
Science Review 65:1063-80.
Woolgar, Steve. 1981. Interests and explanation in the social study of science. Social Studies of
Science 11:365-94.
Wright, Susan. 1986a. Molecular biology or molecular politics? The production of scientific
consensus on the hazards of recombinant DNA technology. Social Studies of Science
16:593-620.
&mdash;. 1986b. Recombinant DNA technology and its social transformation. Osiris 2:303-60.
&mdash;. 1990. Biotechnology and the military. In Agricultural bioethics: Implications of
agricultural biotechnology, edited by S. Gendel, A. D. Kline, D. M. Warren, and S. Yates,
76-98. Ames: Iowa University Press.
&mdash;. Forthcoming. Molecular politics: The formation of regulatory policy for genetic
engineering in the United States and Britain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Susan Wright is the Head of the Science and Society Program of the Residential College
and also teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan
(Ann Arbor, Ml48109 USA). She IS the coauthor and editor of Preventing a Biological
Arms Race (1990) and author of Molecular Politics: The Formation of Regulatory Policy
for Genetic Engineering in the United States and Britain (forthcoming).
